The rule against double jeopardy is based on the common law principle that no man shall be placed in peril of legal penalties more than once on the same accusation.
2. The laws applicable in our country can be found in the Federal Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code :-

2.1. Article 7(2) of the Federal Constitution provides that no person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence may be tried again for the same offence except where the conviction has been quashed and a retrial ordered by a court superior to that by which he was acquitted or convicted.

2.2 For the purpose of this discussion it is sufficient to refer totwo relevant provisions of the CPC which read – Section 302 (i) A person who has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for thesame offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made……

(v) The dismissal of a complaint or the discharged of the accused, is not acquittal for the purposes of this section….

3. The issue which was raised by the Ministry of Internal Security was whether action can be taken against a subject under the Restricted Residence Act 1933 when at the same time he has been charged in court for an offence under Section 4A(a) of the Common Gaming House Act 1953.


4. In my humble opinion, the answer should be in the affirmative. This can be seen in the case of PP v Musa [1970] 1MLJ 101. The respondent had originally been detained under s 8 (1)(a) of the Internal Security Act, 1960. However, in 1968 he was served with a restriction order under s 8(1)(b) of the same Act. He contravened this order had he was accordingly charged for this. This was an appeal against his acquittal.
The issue before the court was whether the act of the Minister in issuing a detention or restriction order was equivalent to a conviction for an offence for the purposes of Art. 7(2).

Syed Othman J observed, “ Wee Chong Jin CJ (of Singapore) in Lim Hock Siew and Ors v The Minister of Interior and Defence [1968] 2 MLJ 219 said that the orders under s 8(1)(a) of Internal Security Act 1960, ie detention orders were the result of an exercise of administrative function. I respectfully agree with this statement of law. There can be no doubt that this statement is equally applicable to a restriction order.
In my judgment, therefore, the satisfaction of the Minister with respect to any person under s 8 of the Internal Security Act, 1960, is not a conviction for an offence or crime and the detention or restriction order is not a punishment for the purpose of Art.7 of the Constitution. The detention or restriction as clearly indicated in s 8 of the Act is an act by the executive to prevent a person from doing harm by the State. The learned president was clearly wrong in having treated a person under preventive detention as an offender. “

In the case of Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister For Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279. The appellant was arrested with six other persons and charged with murder. Due to the lack of evidence, the prosecuting officer later asked the court to grant a discharged to the appellant and six other accused persons, whereupon the court discharged all seven of them. As the seven of them walked out of the courthouse, they were immediately arrested and served with a detention order made by the Minister under the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance,1969.


The appellant contended, inter alia, that the detention order was null and void as it infringed the rule against double jeopardy embodied in Art. 7(2) of the Constitution. The first and main issue in this case revolves around the question of whether preventive detention falls within the ambit of the word conviction under Art. 7(2). The second issue is whether the discharged of an accused person falls within the meaning of acquittal under Art 7(2).

Abdoolcader J observed, ‘….The second matter is the contention that the detention order made by the Minister violates the provisions of Arts 5 and 7 of the Constitution. I find no merit or substance at all in this argument. Art. 7(2) of the Constitution does not affect the position in any way as the discharge of an accused person is not an acquittal for the purpose of a plea of autrefois acquit (s 302 )v) of the Criminal Procedure Code)…..
In any event the acquittal of an accused person does not necessarily mean that he cannot be acting in a manner prejudicial to the purposes set out in s 4(1) of the Ordinance . The ordinary criminal laws of this country and the Ordinance are not substitutes for each other but are complementary. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy embodied in Art. 7(2) of the Constitution and the principle of autrefois acquit and convict enacted in s 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be applied as satisfaction under the Ordinance is not a prosecution or trial. Indeed the very essence of preventive detention is incarceration without the benefit of a prosecution or trial and with no offence proved nor any charged formulated or preferred. There is and can be no identity of offence or of prosecution between detention under the Ordinance and a conviction upon trial by a court of law. An order of detention under the Ordinance is not therefore illegal merely because it nullifies a previous order of discharge or acquittal by a court in a criminal case.”



In Saravanan KS Somu v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 1 CLJ 336, this was the applicant`s application for a writ of habeas corpus` after he was detained pursuant to a detention order (`DO`) issued by the relevant Minister under the second limb of s. 4(1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime ) Ordinance 1969 (` the Ordinance`). The issue inter alia was whether the fact the applicant was charged with similar offence in the session court gave rise to double jeopardy thereby violating Art. 7(2) of the Federal Constitution (`FC`).
It was held that based on Art. 7(2) of the FC, the principle of double jeopardy applied only in case where a person has been earlier been acquitted or convicted of an offence and is charged again for the same offence. In the present case, the appellant had neither been convicted nor acquitted of the offence charged in the session court. He was only charged therein and the case is pending. The allegation of facts in the DO which contained a charged as that of the session court was a mere allegation. The applicant was not being tried. This was a detention without a trial. Ordinary criminal proceedings in which charges are separate preferred and procedures under the Ordinance are two different and matters. Accordingly, there was no violation of Art. 7(2).

5. From the above discussion, it is clear (refer para 3 ) that the action of the Deputy Minister of Internal Security to cancel the Warrant of Arrest and Detention which has been issued earlier by him on the ground of double jeopardy was made in ignorance of the law and devoid of merit.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





ABDUL KADIR MUSA J

CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Procedure - Habeas corpus - Proper procedure - Whether failure of officers properly addressing documents ordering detention to receiving parties vitiated detention order by Minister - Emergency (Public Order And Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 s 3(3)(a) and (b)

HEADNOTES:
The applicant applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The detention was made under s 4(1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ('the Ordinance') by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs for a period of two years. The issue to be decided in this case was whether or not the detentions under s 3(3)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance have complied with the essential requirements of those sections namely, the 'procedurally substantive' requirements that the officers exercising their powers under s 3(3)(a) or (b) of the Ordinance directed the appropriate prison officer(s) or police officer(s) or officer(s) of other similar places authorised by the Minister 'to receive and detain' the detained person. The documents exhibited to show the exercise of the valid power by the relevant officers did not speak of to whom the said documents were addressed to.

Held, allowing the application:

The failure of the officers exercising their power under s 3(3)(a) or (b) of the Ordinance to properly address the documents (directing the appropriate officers to receive and detain) to the receiving parties was a 'failure to comply with one of the procedurally substantive requirements'. Such a 'substantive' failure, made the detentions under s 3(3)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance unlawful. Consequential to that, it had the effect of vitiating the legality of proper exercise of power by the Minister under s 4(1) of the Ordinance (see para 22).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon memohon kepada mahkamah ini untuk writ habeas corpus. Tahanan dibuat di bawah s 4(1) Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Mengecah Jenayah) 1969 ('Ordinan tersebut') oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri untuk dua tahun. Isu yang perlu diputuskan dalam kes ini adalah sama ada tahanan di bawah s 3(3)(a) dan (b) Ordinan tersebut telah ikut keperluan penting seksyen tersebut iaitu keperluan prosedur substantif bahawa pegawai-pegawai yang menggunakan kuasanya di bawah s 3(3)(a) atau (b) Ordinan tersebut perlu mengarahkan pegawai penjara berkenaan atau pegawai polis berkenaan atau [*536] pegawai dari tempat lain yang diluluskan oleh Menteri 'untuk menerima dan menahan' orang yang ditahan. Dokumen yang dieksibitkan untuk menunjukkan penggunaan kuasa yang sah oleh pegawai-pegawai berkenaan tidak menunjukkan kepada siapa ia dialamatkan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan:

Kegagalan pegawai-pegawai berkenaan untuk menggunakan kuasa di bawah s 3(3)(a) atau (b) Ordinan tersebut dengan tidak alamatkan dokumen-dokumen (mengarahkan pegawai-pegawai untuk menerima dan menahan) kepada pihak penerima adalah 'kegagalan untuk ikut salah satu keperluan prosedur substantif'. Kegagalan substantif sebegitu menjadikan tahanan di bawah s 3(3)(a) dan (b) Ordinan tersebut menyalahi undang-undang. Oleh kerana itu, ia mempunyai kesan mengganggu keesahan penggunaan kuasa oleh Menteri di bawah s 4(1) Ordinan tersebut (lihat perenggan 22).]

For cases on application for habeas corpus generally, see 5 Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1727-1824.
For cases on proper procedure for habeas corpus, see 5 Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1803-1818.

Emergency (Public Order And Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ss 3(3)(a), (b), 4(1), (5)
Federal Constitution Art 5(1)

Abd Shukor Ahmad (Baljit Singh Sidhu with him) (Shukor Baljit & Partners) for the applicant.
Fazillah Begum (Najib Zakaria with her) (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General's Chambers) for the respondents.

JUDGMENTBY: ABDUL KADIR MUSA J

ABDUL KADIR MUSA J:

1The applicant, Rasid bin Kulop Mohamad, represented by his counsel, En Shukor Ahmad and En Baljit Singh applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus vide encl 3 supported by his affidavit as per encl 2. The respondent was represented by En Najib Zakaria. The detention was made under s 4(1) Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ('the Ordinance') by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 30 May 2002 for a period of two years effective from the same date. Detained under the same section is Murali a/l Munusamy in 44-48 of 2003 whereby counsels for the applicant and respondents were the same as in 44-69 of 2003. That being so, both parties agreed that, the decision in 44-69 of 2003 will also be equally applicable to 44-48 of 2003.

[*537]

2Section 4(1) of the Ordinance provides as follows:
(1)If the Minister is satisfied that with a view to preventing any
person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order it
is necessary that that person should be detained, ...the Minister
shall make an order ...directing that person to be detained for
any period not exceeding two years.

3In the present application before me, the question of '...the Minister (being) satisfied...' that the relevant detention order '...is necessary...' within the purport of the said s 4(1) is not the issue at the preliminary stage of the detention. What is more compelling for me to consider is whether or not the detentions under sub-ss 3(3)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance have complied with the essential requirements of those sections. I said so because the aforesaid detention order was, from the facts of the application before me, certainly made consequential to the detention under the said s 3(3)(a) and (b).

4For convenience, the said sub-s (3) of the Ordinance states:
(3)Any person arrested and detained under this section may be
detained in police custody for a period not exceeding sixty days
without an order of detention having been made in respect of him
under section 4(1) (of the Ordinance):
Provided that:
(a)he shall not be detained for more than
twenty-four hours except with the authority of a
police officer of or above the rank of an Inspector;
(b)he shall not be detained for more than
forty-eight hours except with the authority of a
police officer of or above the rank of an Assistant
Superintendent;
(c)he shall not be detained for more than thirty
days unless a police officer of or above the rank of
a Deputy Superintendent has reported the
circumstances of the arrest and detention to the
Inspector-General of Police... and the
Inspector-General..., shall forthwith report the
same to the Minister (Emphasis addeed).

5If all the requirements of the said s 3(3) have been complied with, then the arrest and detention by the appropriate police officers concerned has to be lawful by virtue under s 3(5) of the Ordinance. Section 3(5) provides:
(5)Any person detained under the powers conferred by this section
shall be deemed to be in lawful custody, and may be detained
in any prison, or in any police station, or in any
other similar place authorised generally or specially by the
Minister (Emphasis added).

6From the above, it is my firm conclusions that s 3(3)(a)-(c) of the Ordinance speak of:
(1)the 'procedural compliance' by the arresting and detaining
authority and
(2)the 'constitutional right' of individual under art 5 of the
Federal Constitution.

[*538]

7It is only when (1) above is religiously complied with can an individual 'constitutional right' be deprived by virtue of art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. The law that legalised such deprivation is s 3(5) of the Ordinance. Having established that, it is now incumbent on me to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that (1) above has been adhered to. Failure to do so, leaves me with no alternative, but to allow the Application without having to consider 'the satisfaction' of the Minister in issuing the relevant detention order under s 4(1) of the Ordinance. For that purpose, s 3(3) of the Ordinance requires further analysis.

8Dissection of the aforesaid s 3(3) irresistibly led me to two main conclusions which I would classify as:

(a)'procedurally procedure'; and (borang tidak diwartakan, typing error)

(b)'procedurally substantive'.

9In (a) above, it includes 'technicalities'. In that respect, I strongly hold that defect in complying with certain procedural requirement so long as it does not result to gross injustice to the person detained would not result in the detention under s 4(1) to be unlawful. As an example, if the form used has not yet been gazetted, the use of such a form, should not invalidate the order made by the Minister. Another example is a genuine typing error as to the 'date' or 'month' in which the relevant order is being relied upon. Such an error should not invalidate the detention order as being unlawful for want of procedural compliance so long as it can be supported by other documents to show otherwise. Since 'procedurally procedure' defects is non-exhaustive, it will be sufficient for me to cite those two examples, and to elaborate further on (b) above.

10Unlike (a) above, any non-compliance of 'procedurally substantive' procedures goes to the very core of infringement of the 'constitutional right' of individual entrenched in art 5 of the Federal Constitution. In that context, s 3(3) must be read together with s 3(5) of the Ordinance.

11Microscopic analysis of both the aforesaid sub-sections of s 3 of the Ordinance dictates me to search the legal significance of the word 'in' in both ss 3(3) and 3(5) of the Ordinance. In s 3(3), it speaks of '...detained in police custody...', whilst in s 3(5) it clearly states as '...deemed to be in lawful custody...' which can be done so '...in any prison, or in any police station, or in any other similar place authorised... by the Minister'. Thus the use of the word 'in' suggests, without doubt, that, the 'detained person' must be detained in any of the places specified by s 3(5) of the Ordinance. Such custody, by virtue of s 3(3), is 'in police custody' which s 3(5) deems it '...to be in lawful custody...'. Nowhere in both ss 3(3) and 3(5) speak of being 'in' the 'lawful custody' of any of the 'police officers' referred to in s 3(3)(a)-(c) of the Ordinance. The said s 3(3)(a)-(c) identifies 'which' of the police officers 'can do what' in order to make the arrest and detention lawful.

[*539]

12'Can do what', in my opinion, will certainly fall within the intention of 'procedurally substantive' matter(s) referred to me earlier. In the context of my above analysis, in order to satisfy the word 'in' found in s 3(5) discussed above it follows that, any of the officers exercising his power under s 3(3)(a) or (b) of the Ordinance must direct appropriate prison officer(s) or police officer(s) of any police station or officer(s) of other similar places authorised by the Minister 'to receive and detain' the detained person 'in any prison' or 'in any police station' or 'in any other similar place...' but certainly not to himself. To comply with the above requirement, there must be conclusive evidence that the officers exercising their powers under s 3(3)(a) and (b) aforesaid communicate to any officers of 'any prison' or 'any police station' or 'any other similar place (of lawful detention)' which can be extracted from all the relevant facts of the Application. Unfortunately I could not find any.

13Close scrutiny of those relevant facts, there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that there was any oral communication of the aforesaid nature from either chief Insp Abdul Rahman bin Hj Hamid or ASP Mansor bin Mohamad. Documentary evidence of the exercise of a valid power by the former is evidenced by exh 'ARAH 2' of encl 12 whilst that of ASP Mansor is exhibited by 'MMI' to encl 11. Both the said officers rightly exercised their powers under s 3(3)(a) and s 3(3)(b) of the Ordinance respectively.

14However close reading of both the said 'ARAH 2' and 'MMI' shows clearly that, neither the said documents speaks of 'to whom' both the said documents were addressed to. They merely speak of the respective officers exercising their respective power and explained why the detained person, Rasid bin Kulop Mohamad, needed to be detained further under s 3(3)(a) and later s 3(3)(b) of the Ordinance. It is my considered conclusion that both 'ARAH 2' and 'MMI' should be addressed to the 'detaining authority', otherwise such documents are not authorisation documents. I find support to my said conclusion in 'WAN-1' to encl 10 of Superintendent Wan Ahmad Najmuddin bin Mohd.

15In the said 'WAN-1' of encl 10, Superintendent Wan Ahmad was acting under s 3(3)(c) of the Ordinance whereby he is required to report 'the circumstances of the arrest and detention' of Rasid bin Kulop Mohamad 'to the Inspector-General of Police or to a police officer designated by the Inspector-General in that behalf...'. From 'WAN-1', it is clearly addressed to 'ACP Abdul Rahim bin Hj Hanafi, KPP D7, of Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah, PDRM, Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur. ACP Abdul Rahim bin Hj Hanafi, was the 'police officer designated by the Inspector-General of Police' to receive such report as stated in para 3 of encl 10 as supported by 'ARAH-1' to encl 9.

16Section 3(3)(c) placed the burden of reporting the aforesaid arrest and detention to the Minister on the aforesaid 'designated officer'. This was done by him as evidenced by 'ARAH-2' to the same enclosure. Again the said 'ARAH-2' is properly addressed to:
YB Menteri Dalam Negeri Kementerian Dalam Negeri...

[*540]

17From the above, it is demonstrated that, what is required of 'procedural substantive' actions to be taken has been taken by appropriate officer(s) by addressing 'to':

(i)ASP Abdul Rahim bin Hj Nahafi aforesaid by Supt Wan Ahmad Najmuddin bin Mohd; and

(ii)YB Menteri Dalam Negeri, Kementerian Dalam Negeri, by the aforesaid ACP Abdul Rahim

under s 3(3)(c) of the Ordinance.

18Even the 'detention order' made by the Minister under s 4(1) of the Ordinance as per 'ZAZ-1' to encl 6 of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs was addressed to as follows:
Kepada:
Penguasa
Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak,
Simpang Rengam,
Johor.
Ketua Polis Negara,
Bukit Aman,
50560 Kuala Lumpur.
Semua Pegawai Polis Diraja Malaysia yang berkenaan.

19The presence of the word 'Kepada' in 'ZAZ-1', 'to ACP Abdul Rahim bin Hj Hanafi' in 'WAN-1' to encl 10, and 'to YB Menteri Dalam Negeri...' in 'ARAH-2' to encl 9 enhanced my conclusion that the respective relevant documents must be addressed 'to' appropriate officer(s) who is or are entrusted to take 'in custody' the applicant in this Application; thus satisfies one of the 'procedural substantive' requirements for the valid exercise of a preventive detention as required by law. This is absent in the case of:

(1)'ARAH-2' to encl 12 (the affidavit of the Chief Inspector Abdul Rahman bin Hj Abdul Hamid under s 3(3)(a) of the Ordinance); and

(2)'MM-1' to encl 11 (the affidavit of DSP Mansor b Mohamed).

20Both 'ARAH-2' and 'MM-1' were not addressed to anyone at all. Without it, the question is, ' to whose custody should the applicant, Rashid bin Kulop Mohamad be placed?'. Both the said documents only speak of the need to detain further for a period of more than (i) 24 hours (s 3(3)(a) of the Ordinance in respect of 'ARAH-2'); and (ii) 48 hours (s 3(3)(b), ibid, in respect of 'MM-1'). If those two documents [*541] which speak clearly of the respective officers' right to detain the applicant as stated earlier are placed alongside with 'ZAZ-1' to encl 6, a glaring similarity as to the form can be seen as illustrated below except that, 'ZAZ-1' as pointed out above, is properly addressed ' to' the appropriate ' detaining authority' ' whose custody of the applicant was being properly placed' but not in the respect of 'ARAH-2' and 'MM-1' aforesaid.

21In both 'ARAH-2' and 'MM-1' aforesaid, the following words can be found:
BAHAWA saya C/Insp A Rahman Bin Hj A Hamid ... berpuas hati
berkenaan kes terhadap (the applicant)... dengan menjalankan
kuasa-kuasa yang diberi kepada saya di bawah Seksyen 3(3)(a) (of the
Ordinance), maka saya dengan ini memberi kuasa supaya (the
applicant) dilanjutkan tahanannya selama 24 jam lagi... (Emphasis
added).

in respect of 'ARAH-2' and 'C/Insp A Rahman ...' and 'Seksyen 3(3)(a)' were being substituted with '(ASP) MANSOR BIN MOHAMAD' and 'Seksyen 3(3)(b)...' respectively in 'MM-1'. The effect to that is to legalise the respective relevant detentions under the aforesaid sections. Words having similar effect of legalising detention under s 4(1) of the Ordinance as for 'ZAZ-1' are as follows:
BAHAWASANYA saya (DATO' ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN ZIN, TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM
NEGERI, Malaysia) berpuas hati yang Perintah ini adalah perlu dibuat ke
atas (the applicant)...
Oleh yang demikian, pada menjalankan kuasa yang diberi kepada saya di
bawah Seksyen 4(1) ('of the Ordinance'), maka saya mengarahkan
dengan Perintah ini supaya ('the applicant') ditahan selama dua
tahun... (Emphasis added).

22The word 'mengarahkan' without doubt, authorised the person(s) addressed ' to' thereto, to receive the applicant 'in his or their custody' under s 4(1) of the Ordinance similar to 'authorising' the person(s) to do the same within the permitted periods as provided by ss 3(3)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance. The glaring difference is that, as pointed above and at the risk of repetition, in respect of 'ZAZ-1' it was properly addressed to the 'receiving authority' but not in either 'ARAH-2' or 'MM-1'. Failure to do so is what I have termed as a ' failure to comply with one of the 'procedurally substantive' requirements'. Such a 'substantive' failure, compelled me to conclude that the detentions under s 3(3)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance as unlawful. Consequential to that, it has the effect of vitiating the legality of a proper exercise of power by the Minister under s 4(1) of the Ordinance.

23On the premises above, and for the reasons elaborated above, I am left with no alternative but to issue the writ of habeas corpus as applied for accordingly; and so ordered.





CATCHWORDS:
Administrative Law - Habeas Corpus - Detention of accused in police custody exceeding maximum period for detention - Subsequent Detention Order by Minister for continued detention of accused - Effect of - Whether legal and authorised - Federal Constitution, art 5(1) - Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) - Ordinance 1969, s 4(1)

Constitutional Law - Habeas corpus - Detention of accused in police custody exceeding maximum period of detention - Subsequent Detention Order by Minister for continued detention - Violation of Federal Constitution, art 5(1)

HEADNOTES:
On October 1, 1986 at about 12.20 a.m., acting on information received, the applicant Koh Yoke Koon was arrested by the police at a stall in Jalan Solok, Tangkak, Muar, Johore. The applicant was then remanded in custody under section 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code for 14 days pursuant to an order made by a Magistrate. He was released on October 14, 1986, but on the same day he was re-arrested and detained at Muar police station pending inquiries under section 3. Upon the conclusion of these investigations, the police submitted a report to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

On December 9, 1986, the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs signed the Detention Order under section 4 of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969 authorising the detention of the applicant for a period of two years with effect from December 12, 1986.

The applicant, therefore, challenged the validity of the Detention Order by the Minister and the detention thereunder.

Held, granting the habeas corpus and setting the applicant free:
(1)having regard to the provisions of the Ordinance, the requirements
therein as to the place of detention even though procedural are mandatory in
character and so breaches thereof cannot be condoned;


(2)the applicant's period of detention in police custody at the Muar
police station from December 14, 1986, until some time in the morning of
December 16, 1986 when he was removed to the Rehabilitation Centre was wholly
unauthorised and therefore in violation of Article 5(1) as being otherwise
than in accordance with law;


(3)the Detention Order will not operate to salvage the case for the
detaining authority for it specificially provided for detention at the Centre
for two years from December 12, 1986 and cannot therefore have the effect of
rendering legal the applicant's illegal detention at the Muar police station
from December 14, 1986 until his removal therefrom on the morning of December
16, 1986;


(4)the detention of the applicant under section 4(1) was not procured by
steps all of which were entirely regular nor was the court satisfied that "
every step in the process" [*46] which led to such detention was
followed with extreme regularity and therefore the court should not allow the
imprisonment to continue. To hold to the contrary would in effect mean that
the Minister had power to continue the detention of one who is being
illegally detained;


(5)the Deputy Minister had unwittingly exceeded the powers conferred upon
him by ordering the continued detention of one who was being illegally
detained with the result that the Detention Order, even if valid, was not
legally effective at the date of the service thereof to allow the detention
of the applicant to continue;


(6)the applicant was entitled to be set at liberty.

Per curiam: "... in a matter concerning the liberty of the subject -- always a priceless asset -- the court should walk very warily, preferring to interpret words and phrases in their ordinary and natural meaning than to embark on inferences or speculations about such a power."

Cases referred to
Lau Lek Eng & Ors v The Minister of Home Affairs, Singapore & Anor [1972] 2 MLJ 4
Re Tan Boon Liat [1977] 2 MLJ 108, 114
Re Datuk James Wong Kin Min [1976] 2 MLJ 245
The Reverend Thomas Pelham Dale's case (1880-1881) 6 QBD 376
Bowditch v Balchin (1850) 5 Ex 378, 155 ER 165
Barnard v Gorman [1941] AC 378, 393
Andrew s/o Thamboosamy v Supt of Pudu Prisons [1976] 2 MLJ 156, 158
Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129




CRIMINAL APPLICATION

Christopher Fernando for the applicant.

Mohamed Bazain (Federal Counsel) for the Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia and Superintendent Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak, Pulau Pinang.

ACTION:

CRIMINAL APPLICATION

LAWYERS: Christopher Fernando for the applicant.

Mohamed Bazain (Federal Counsel) for the Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia and Superintendent Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak, Pulau Pinang.

JUDGMENTBY: EDGAR JOSEPH JR J



Koh Yoke Koon, the applicant herein, challenges both the validity of a Detention Order dated December 9, 1986, passed against him pursuant to the provisions of section 4(1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969 ("the Ordinance") and his detention thereunder.

The foundation documents in the case merit reproduction in full.

The Detention Order, being Ex. AGY 5 to Encl. 12, provided as follows:
"That I, being satisfied that this Order is necessary to be imposed on
the person named below with a view to preventing him from committing
any acts that may be prejudicial to public order or for the suppression
of violence or for the prevention of crimes involving violence.

NAME	NRIC NO.
KOH YOKE KOON	A 0555693

By reason whereof and in exercising the powers conferred on me pursuant
to Section 4(1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime)
Ordinance, 1969, I hereby by this Order order that the person
abovenamed be detained for two years from the 12th day of December 1986
at the Rehabilitation Centre, Pulau Jerejak or at any other place that
may be ordered by me from time to time.
Signed on the 9th day of December 1986.
sgd.
Dato' Megat Junid Bin Megat Ayob"

The reason for the issue of the Detention Order (Ex. AGY 3 -- Encl. 12) was as follows:
"That you are a member of a secret society which commits violent
criminal acts and your actions have threatened public order."

The allegations of fact upon which the Detention Order was based ("the allegations of fact") being Ex. AGY 4 to Encl. 12 were as follows:
1. That you are a member of a secret society known as "WAH KEE"
which has actively operated in the town of Tangkak, Muar, Johor
since 1984.
2. That you together with several of your friends on the 26.11.1984
at about 10.30 at night, whilst armed with parang and wood,
attacked 3 male Chinese at Jalan Ong Siong, Tangkak, Muar, Johore.
3. That you together with your friends in early 1983 assaulted a
Chinese youth because he refused to be a member of your society.
4. That you together with your friends on 24.6.1986 at about 10.15
at night attacked a male Chinese and his friend with a crash
helmet at Jalan Solok, Tangkak, Muar, Johore.
5. That you together with your friends in the month of July 1986, at
Jalan Tangkak, Muar, assaulted a male Chinese with a crash helmet
and also collided into another male Chinese.
6. That you together with several of your friends on 28.9.1986, at
about 11.00 at night at an eating stall at New Village I,
Tangkak, attacked a male Chinese where the victim sustained a
laceration on his head and abrasions over several parts of his
body.

All references in this judgment to sections shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be to the Ordinance.

The essential facts may be stated briefly thus:

[*47] On October 1, 1986, at about 12.20 a.m., acting on information received in connection with Tangkak Police Report 1999/86, being Ex. AGY 1 to Encl. 12, the applicant was arrested by the police at a stall in Jalan Solok, Tangkak, Muar, Johore. The applicant was then remanded in custody under section 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code for 14 days pursuant to an order made by a Magistrate. He was released on October 14, 1986, but, on the same day, he was re-arrested by D.P.C. Basri bin Mohd. Amin, detained at Muar police station pending enquiries under section 3 and a copy of the reasons for arrest, being Ex. AGY 3 to Encl. 12, served upon him. Upon the conclusion of these investigations, the police submitted a report to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

On December 9, 1986 the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs signed the Detention Order under section 4, being Ex. AGY 5 to Encl. 12, authorising the detention of the applicant for a period of two years with effect from December 12, 1986 at the Pulau Jerejak Rehabilitation Centre. However, the Detention Order, annexed to which was Borang 1, being Ex. AGY 4 to Encl. 12, was served upon the applicant by Inspector Baldev Singh and Inspector Anwar Shahruddin Abdullah only on December 14, 1986 at No. 11 Jalan Solok, Tangkak, Muar. Nevertheless, this delay was, in my opinion, satisfactorily explained by Inspector Abdul Ghoffor in his affidavit affirmed to on March 30, 1987.

The applicant was, at the time of the service of the Detention Order, informed by one Detective Sergeant 30180 Ng Thin Hong, in the Hokkien dialect, of his right to make representations to the Advisory Board and furnished with a copy each of the reasons for the issue of the Detention Order and the allegations of fact in accordance with section 5(2). Two days later -- that is to say on the morning of December 16, 1986 the applicant was escorted to the Pulau Jerejak Rehabilitation Centre ("the Centre").

It was strongly argued by Mr. Fernando, counsel for the applicant, that the maximum period for detention pending enquiries under section 3(3) was 60 days and that in the present case that period had expired on October 13, 1986 but yet the applicant had been detained at the Muar police station until some time in the morning of October 16, 1986 when he was removed to the Centre pursuant to the Detention Order dated December 9, 1986 which, although it came into force on December 12, 1986, had authorised detention under section 4 for a period of two years at the Centre and nowhere else.

Upon these facts, the first question as regards this part of the case is: by what authority was the applicant being detained at the Muar police station from December 14, 1986 until some time in the morning of December 16, 1986 when he was removed to the Centre.

In reply to this question, the learned Federal Counsel, Encik Mohd. Bazain, submitted that the Detention Order supplied the necessary authority for that. He contended that the place of detention designated in the Order was not important so long as the period of detention was lawful. In support, he cited the case of Lau Lek Eng & 7 Ors v The Minister of Home Affairs, Singapore & Anor [1972] 2 MLJ 4 which decided, inter alia, that habeas corpus is not an available remedy where the complaint relates to the manner and conditions of detention. I do not consider this authority of any assistance as the complaint here is not as to the manner or conditions of detention but as to the place of detention.

The provisions of the Ordinance, so far as material to the question for decision, are as follows:
"3.(3) Any person arrested and detained under this section may be
detained in police custody for a period not exceeding
sixty-days without an order of detention having been made in
respect of him under section 4(1):
Provided that --
(a)he shall not be detained for more than twenty-four hours except
with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of
Inspector;
(b)he shall not be detained for more than forty-eight hours except
with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of
Assistant Superintendent;
(c)he shall not be detained for more than thirty days unless a
police officer of or above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has
reported the circumstances of the arrest and detention to the
Inspector-General of Police or to a police officer designated by
the Inspector-General in that behalf and the Inspector-General or
the police officer so designated by him, as the case may be,
shall forthwith report the same to the Minister."
"3.(5) Any person detained under the powers conferred by this
section shall be deemed to be in lawful custody, and may be
detained in any prison, or in any police station, or in any
other similar place authorised generally or specially by the
Minister."
(Emphasis added)
"4.(2) Every person detained in pursuance of a detention order
shall be detained in such place as the Minister may
direct and in accordance with instructions issued by the
Minister and any rules made under sub-section (3)."
"4.(3) The Minister may by rules provide for --
[*48] (a)the maintenance and management of any place referred to in
sub-section (2);... "
(Emphasis added)

Furthermore, if it is proposed to remove a detinu from any place of detention to another place of detention section 12(1) requires the necessary Order for removal from the Minister.

Specifically, it reads:
"12. (1) The Minister may by order direct the removal from any place
of detention to another place of detention to be specified in
such order of any person detained in pursuance of the provisions
of section 4, to be there detained for the whole or any part or
parts of such period for which it has been ordered that such
person shall be detained."
(Emphasis added)

In order to ensure the legality of the custody of the detinu during the period of transit from any place of detention to another, section 12(2) reads:
"Any person in course of removal under the provisions of sub-section
(1) shall be deemed to be in lawful custody".
(Emphasis added).

Having regard to the provisions of the Ordinance aforesaid, I was satisfied that the requirements therein as to the place of detention even though procedural are mandatory in character and so breaches thereof cannot be condoned. To quote Ong Hock Sim F.J. in Re Tan Boon Liat [1977] 2 MLJ 108, 114:
"... there are mandatory rules, even of procedure, which cannot be
passed over lightly as irregularities, because they are incurably
illegal as being in contravention of strictly imperative provisions".

And, in the same case, this is what Lee Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo) said:
"For myself I find it difficult to see how our Article 5 could be
interpreted to exclude the question of procedure even though there is
no mention of procedure. The exclusion of procedure is merely an
inference drawn from the remarks of Suffian F.J. in Karam Singh's
case [1969] 1 MLJ 129. He was merely pointing out the difference in
the wordings of the Indian Constitution and our Constitution. He did
not say that procedure was not part of the law. I am inclined to agree
with Encik Karpal Singh's contention that the expression "in accordance
with law" in Article 5 of our Constitution is wide enough to cover
procedure as well. Here the point is not whether the question of
procedure is more important under our Constitution than under the
other. If the expression "in accordance with law" were to be construed
as to exclude procedure than it would make nonsense of Article 5.

Now, the maximum permissible period of detention in police custody is sixty days (section 3(3)) and so long as this period is not exceeded the person detained shall be deemed to be in lawful custody (section 3(5)). But, where, as here, the period of detention in police custody has exceeded the maximum permissible period of 60 days (which ended on December 13, 1986) the deeming provision in section 3(5) does not bite. The result is that the applicant's period of detention in police custody at the Muar police station from December 14, 1986 until some time in the morning of December 16, 1986 when he was removed to the Centre was wholly unauthorised and therefore in in violation of Article 5(1) as being otherwise than in accordance with law.

The Detention Order will not operate to salvage the case for the detaining authority for it specifically provided for detention at the Centre for two years from December 12, 1986 and cannot therefore have the effect of rendering legal the applicant's illegal detention at the Muar police station from December 14, 1986 until his removal therefrom on the morning of December 16, 1986.

The next question was whether the continued detention of the applicant at the Centre was legal.

It is not difficult to cite an anthology of cases for the proposition that in a matter of deprivation of liberty strict compliance with the law is necessary. My choice of cases is as follows:

In Re Datuk James Wong Kin Min [1976] 2 MLJ 245, Lee Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo), speaking for the Federal Court which upheld the release of one detained in West Malaysia, under an order found to be valid only in Sarawak, said:
"In a matter so fundamental and important as the liberty of the
subject, strict compliance with statutory requirements must be observed
in depriving a person of his liberty. The material provisions of the
law authorising detention without trial must be strictly construed and
safeguards which the law deliberately provides for the protection of
any citizen must be liberally interpreted. Where the detention cannot
be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by the law,
the detention is bad and the person detained is entitled to be released
forthwith. Where personal liberty is concerned an applicant in applying
for a writ of habeas corpus is entitled to avail himself of any
technical defects which may invalidate the order which deprives him of
his liberty ... An inherent part of their (the courts') function is to
see that the executive acts within the law and does not encroach
unnecessarily into the realm of liberty of the subject... If this
constitutional guarantee (of article 5(1)) is to have any real meaning
at all, then it is imperative that the courts should intervene whenever
the liberty of the subject is encroached upon not in accordance with
the law."

[*49] In the Reverend Thomas Pelham Dale's case (1880-1881) 6 QBD 376 Brett L.J. said:
"Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule,
which has always been acted upon by the Courts of England, that if any
person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so
by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails
to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the
court will not allow the imprisonment to continue."
(Emphasis added).

And this is what Cotton L.J. said at pages 469, 470:
"I quite agree with Brett L.J. that when persons take upon themselves
to cause another to be imprisoned, they must strictly follow the
powers under which they are assuming to act, and if they do not, the
person imprisoned may be discharged, although the particulars in which
they have failed to follow those powers may be matters of mere form."

(Emphasis added.)

In Re Tan Boon Liat [1977] 2 MLJ 108, 114 ( ibid) at pages 110, 111, Lee Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo) quoted the above passages in the judgments of Brett and Cotton L.JJ. with approval.

In the particular circumstances of the present case and, for the reasons stated, I am satisfied that the detention of the applicant under section 4(1) was not procured by steps "all of which were entirely regular" nor was I satisfied that "every step in the process" which led to such detention was followed with extreme regularity" and therefore the Court should "not allow the imprisonment to continue."

I would add that to hold to the contrary would, in effect, mean that the Minister has the power to continue the detention of one who is being illegally detained. I cannot conceive that Parliament could have intended to confer upon the Minister such a draconian power in the absence of explicit statutory provision. In other words, in a matter concerning the liberty of the subject -- always a priceless asset -- the Court should walk very warily, preferring to interpret words and phrases in their ordinary and natural meaning than to embark on inferences or speculations about such a power. I am fortified in this by the following dictum of Pollock C.B. in Bowditch v Balchin (1850) 5 Ex 378, 155 ER 165 cited with approval by Lord Wright in Barnard v Gorman [1941] AC 378, 393: "In a case in which the liberty of the subject is concerned, we cannot go beyond the natural construction of the statute."

It is true that a perusal of section 4(1) shows that the Minister is empowered to detain any person for a period not exceeding two years if he is satisfied as to the conditions precedent laid down therein. Whilst the words "any person" are not defined in the Ordinance I am inclined to hold that they include one who is being detained pending enquiries in accordance with the provision of section 3(1) or one who is at large; they cannot, however, be given an extended meaning to include one who is being illegally detained for otherwise it would amount to the eclipse of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 5(1) of the Constitution, the disproportionate accumulation of power in one sphere and a negation of justice. I would add that any ambiguity in this regard would have to be resolved in favour of the subject since habeas corpus is not a discretionary remedy. I am supported in this by the judgment of Suffian L.P. in Andrew s/o Thamboosamy v Supt of Pudu Prisons [1976] 2 MLJ 156, 158 when he said:
"... we agree that any form of detention does violence to section 5(1)
of the Constitution... and hence power given by law to detain must be
construed strictly and in case of doubt or ambiguity the court
should lean in favour of the subject." (Emphasis added.)

His Lordship, however, added:
"... if the Government exercises a power conferred on it by
Parliament and keeps within the law, then the duty of the court is
quite clear; the court should simply apply the law, no matter how harsh
its effect may be on the (individual affected). His remedy is then not
judicial but political and administrative."

(Emphasis added)

In all the circumstances, the conclusion at which I had arrived was that Deputy Minister had, no doubt, unwittingly exceeded the powers conferred upon him, by ordering the continued detention of one who was being illegally detained with the result that the Detention Order, even if valid, was not legally effective at the date of the service thereof to allow the detention of the applicant to continue.

Accordingly, on this ground alone, the applicant was entitled to be set at liberty and I so ordered. In view of this, it is unnecessary for me to rule on the various other submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant though, I did remark, in the course of the argument, that having regard to the decision of the Federal Court in Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129, it was not open to me to consider either the question whether there was reasonable cause to make the Detention Order or the protestations of innocence of the applicant.

[*50] In the result, I made a formal order granting habeas corpus and setting the applicant free.

Order accordingly.







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Demonstrasi perlu ditangani dengan bijaksana dan berlandaskan undang-undang supaya tindakan yang diambil tidak dicabar oleh mana-mana pihak. Oleh yang demikian pegawai dan anggota polis mestilah memahami peruntukan undang-undang, kesalahan-kesalahan yang boleh berlaku dalam sesuatu demonstrasi serta kuasa-kuasa polis untuk bertindak terhadap mereka yang terlibat dalam satu satu tunjuk perasaan. Berikut diperturunkan pelbagai peraturan yang terdapat kuasa-kuasa dalam undang-undang negara.

Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Kecil 1955 (Akta 336)

Seksyen 14 - Kelakuan Aib Sesiapa pun yang menggunakan perkataan-perkataan yang kurang sopan, mengugut, aib atau menghina atau berkelakuan dengan cara yang mengugut atau menghina atau menampalkan atau melekatkan atau mempamerkan sebarang kertas bertulis atau lukisan yang kurang sopan mengugut aib atau menghinakan dengan tujuan membangkitkan kemarahan untuk mengganggu keamanan atau di mana keamanan mungkin terganggu boleh dikenakan denda yang tidak melebihi RM100. Seksyen 31 - Tangkapan mana-mana pegawai polis boleh menangkap tanpa waran sesiapa pun yang melakukan kesalahan ini yang dilihatnya atau mensyaki dengan munasabah melakukan kesalahan ini melainkan orang tersebut memberi nama dan alamatnya dan memuaskan pegawai berkenaan yang ia akan mematuhi menjawab mana-mana saman atau perbicaraan yang mungkin diambil terhadapnya.

Akta Polis 1967 (Akta 344)

Seksyen 27 - Kuasa untuk mengawalselia perhimpunan, perjumpaan dan perarakan

1. Mana-mana pegawai penjaga daerah polis atau mana-mana pegawai polis yang diberi kuasa dengan seajarnya secara bertulis olehnya boleh mengarahkan, dengan apa-apa cara yang difikirkannya patut perjalanan di tempat-tempat awam dalam daerah polis itu semua perhimpunan, perjumpaan dan perarakan orang atau kenderaan dan boleh menetapkan jalan manakah dan waktu bilakah, perhimpunan atau perjumpaan itu boleh diadakan atau perarakan boleh lalu.
2. Mana-mana orang yang berniat mengadakan atau mengumpukan mana-mana perhimpunan atau perjumpaan atau membentuk sesuatu perarakan di mana-mana tempat awam yang tersebut dahulu, hendaklah sebelum mengadakan, mengumpulkan atau membentuk perhimpunan, perjumpaan atau perarakan itu, membuat kepada pegawai penjaga daerah polis di mana perhimpunan, perjumpaan perarakan itu akan diadakan suatu permohonan untuk mendapatkan lesen bagi maksud itu, dan jika pegawai polis itu berpuas hati bahawa perhimpunan, perjumpaan atau perarakan itu tidak mungkin memudaratkan kepentingan keselamatan Malaysia atau mana-mana bahagiannya atau membangkitkan kekacauan keamanan, dia hendaklah mengeleuarkan lesen dalam bentuk yang ditetapkan dengan menyatakan nama pemegang lesen itu dan menerangkan syarat-syarat atas mana perhimpunan, perjumpaan atau perarakan dibenarkan.
3. Kuasa Polis - Mana-mana pegawai polis boleh menghentikan mana-mana perhimpunan, perjumpaan atau perarakan yang mengenainya lesen telah tidak dikeluarkan atau setelah dikeluarkan telah kemudiannya dibatalkan di bawah sub-seksyen (2) atau yang melanggar mana-mana syarat-syarat sesuatu lesen yang telah dikeluarkan mengenainya di bawah sub-seksyen tersebut; dan mana-mana pegawai polis boleh memerintahkan orang-orang dalam perhimpunan, perjumpaan dan perarakan itu bersurai.
4. Mana-mana orang tak mematuhi apa-apa perintah yang diberi di bawah sub-seksyen (1) atau sub-seksyen (3) adalah melakukan satu kesalahan.
5. Apa-apa perhimpunan, perjumpaan atau perarakan

1. yang berlaku tanpa lesen yang dikeluarkan di bawah sub-seksyen (2); atau
2. di mana tiga orang atau lebih yang mengambil bahagian mengabai atau enggan menurut apa-apa perintah yang diberi di bawah subseksyen (1) atau subseksyen (3) hendaklah disifatkan sebagai suatu perhimpunan haram, dan semua orang yang hadir, dijumpai di atau mengambil bahagian dalam perhimpunan atau perarakan itu dan, berkenaan dengan perhimpunan, perjumpaan dan perarakan yang tiada lesen telah dikeluarkan baginya, semua orang hadir, dijumpai di atau mengambil bahagian dalam atau bersangkut paut dengan mengadakan, mengumpul atau mengarah perhimpunan, perjumpaan atau perarakan itu, adalah melakukan suatu kesalahan.

6. Hukuman - Mana-mana orang yang melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen ini boleh apabila disabitkan dikenakan denda tidak kurang daripada dua ribu ringgit tetapi tidak lebih daripada RM10,000 dan hukuman penjara selama tempoh tidak melebihi satu tahun.

Akta Mesin Cetak dan Penerbitan 1984 (Akta 301)
Seksyen 11 - Dokumen bercetak hendaklah mengandungi nama pencetak dan penerbit

1. Tiap-tiap hasil penerbitan yang bercetak atau diterbitkan dalam Malaysia hendaklah dicatitkan nama dan alamat pencetak dan penerbitnya dengan mudah dibaca dalam Bahasa Malaysia atau Bahasa Inggeris pada lembaran pertama atau akhir.
2. Tiada seorang pun boleh menerbit, menghasilkan semula, menjual, mengelilingi atau menggeran atau menawarkan untuk menerbit, menghasil semula, menjual, mengelilingi, atau mengedar apa-apa hasil penerbitan yang tidak mempunyai nama dan alamat pencetak dan penerbit, atau berkenaan dengan rakaman suara, nama dan alamat pengeluar dicetak dengan jelasnya pada kulit atau bekas dan mana-mana orang yang bertindak dengan melanggari seksyen ini adalah melakukan satu kesalahan dan, apabila disabitkan, boleh dikenakan penjara selama tempoh tidak melebihi setahun atau denda tidak melebihi lima ribu ringgit atau kedua-duanya.
3. Berkenaan dengan hasil penerbitan yang diimpot ke dalam Malaysia maka adalah menjadi pematuhan yang cukup akan seksyen ini kiranya nama pencetak, penerbit atau pengeluar dicetak dengan jelas pada mana-mana bahagian hasil penerbitan atau bekas itu.

Seksyen 20 - Tangkapan tanpa waran Mana-mana pegawai polis boleh menangkap tanpa waran mana-mana orang yang didapati melakukan atau dengan munasabahnya disyaki melakukan atau cuba melakukan atau mendapatkan atau bersubahat dengan mana-mana orang untuk melakukan apa-apa kesalahan di bawah akta ini.

Kanun Keseksaan
Seksyen 147 - Seksaan kerana merusuh Barang siapa melakukan kesalahan merusuh hendaklah diseksa dengan penjara selama tempoh yang boleh sampai dua tahun atau dengan denda atau dengan kedua-duanya. Seksyen 148 - Memiliki senjata-senjata maut dalam rusuhan Barang siapa menghadiri, mengambil bahagian atau berada dalam apa-apa rusuhan dan memiliki apa-apa senjatapi, amunisi, bahan letupan, benda melecur, benda yang memudaratkan, kayu, batu, atau apa-apa senjata maut yang boleh digunakan sebagai senjata untuk menyerang hendaklah diseksa dengan penjara selama tempoh yang boleh sampai lima tahun, atau dengan denda atau dengan kedua-duanya. Seksyen 186 - Menghalang penjawat awam pada menjalankan kerja-kerja jawatannya Barang siapa dengan sengaja menghalang seseorang penjawat awam pada menjalankan kerja-kerja jawatannya hendaklah diseksa dengan penjara selama tempoh yang boleh sampai tiga bulan, atau dengan denda yang boleh sampai seribu ringgit atau dengan kedua-duanya.